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SELF-DETERMINATION AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY
ARTHUR

J.

DYCK*

For centuries now, philosophical and religious ethics, particularly
religious ethics, has reflected on the moral responsibilities of physi
cians, patients, and of the patients' families. Ethics is the body of sys
tematic thought which informs the perspective of this essay.
Among the practitioners who draw upon ethics are the clergy. It
should come as no surprise, then, that the clergy frequently become
involved with patients who are confronted by serious health problems.
When these patients do not know or appreciate the full extent of their
illnesses, they wonder about the seriousness of their condition and
whether they will live or die. They speculate, for better or worse, about
what is in store for them in the future. The clergy is called upon to
provide comfort and, at times, advice about which particular course of
action a patient should pursue; patients, however, often bring to these
dialogues insufficient information about their medical condition and
possible choices. When the physician has not talked in candor with
the patient, the result is almost inevitably uncertainty and confusion
about what lies ahead.
Now there is some assistance for physicians and patients who
confront the issues of serious illness and how to work together to re
solve the many issues that may arise with respect to treatment choices.
Professor Jay Katz, in his recent book The Silent World ofDoctor and
Patient, I makes a substantial case for the importance of opening up
meaningful conversations between physicians and their patients.
What Katz hopes to accomplish is to educate physicians to recognize
their own limitations, to improve their ability to increase patient au
tonomy, to err on the side of accepting patients as self-determining,
and to honor their choices after thorough conversation. The goal of
this conversation is to provide an informed basis for decisionmaking,
* Mary B. Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics, Harvard School of Public
Health, Member of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School; B.A., Tabor College, 1953;
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thereby enhancing the freedom of patients to be self-determining. Katz
cites some very moving examples of the mutual relief and comfort ex
perienced by physicians and patients when they face together the awe
some truth, in given instances, that a patient's impending death cannot
be prevented (pp. 219-24). He argues convincingly that dissipating the
fog of superficial small talk that may envelop patients who fear the
worst can alleviate much anxiety and guilt and can facilitate what pos
sibilites may exist for strengthening the bonds of human fellowship.
Katz demonstrates that genuine conversations between physi
cians and patients are necessary to reveal to both parties the limits of
medical knowledge and of self awareness. Katz argues further that
professional education should foster greater awareness of these mutual
vulnerabilities and of physicians' obligations to stimulate inner reflec
tion in themselves and their patients. Con scire-to know together-is
the root verb of "conscious" and "conscience," and it is through con
versation that mutual understanding is achieved.
Katz carefully distinguishes autonomy from self-determination.
Autonomy refers to the capacity of individuals to exercise their right
of self-determination (p. 105). In turn, the right of self-determination
refers to the right of individuals to make their own decisions without
interference (p. 105). Self-determination has choice as its external
component; its internal component is reflection. Conversation in
creases autonomy by increasing the conscious, rational elements which
enter into decisionmaking. Physicians are obligated to converse with
patients in order to stimulate the reflection necessary to meet the pa
tient's need for more autonomy and to honor the right to self-determi
nation. Although this is paternalistic in Katz's view (p. 110), it is an
obligation for both physician and patient, grounded in mutuality.
Katz is well aware that patients may sometimes be reticent or
even resistant to converse. Some patients see the physician's insistence
on conversation under these circumstances as an invasion of their
right to privacy. In a conflict between the values of autonomy and
privacy, Katz maintains that privacy should be invaded when to do so
enhances the patient's psychological autonomy: "Insisting on conver
sation and reflection expresses a concern for patients' needs. The ulti
mate acceptance of their choices expresses a respect for their rights"
(p. 141). Katz criticizes current judicial decisions regarding informed
consent because they do not recognize sufficiently that the failure of
physicians to converse in ways that strengthen patients' autonomy
constitutes harm to that patient (pp. 80-82).
As Katz describes instances of beneficial conversations between
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physicians and patients, and tragic failures to converse, I find that I
certainly want to be in the care of the kind of physician Katz is asking
physicians to be. I wish to have a solid basis on which to make medi
cal decisions and I value the respect for my capacities by those who
can help provide that basis. However, were I to be ill, a physician
would not be the only one with whom I would cherish conversation
and by whom I would expect to be valued. I have a wife and children.
I have a brother and sister. I have a minister. I can rely on their love
and concern, and were I to be confined to a hospital bed, I would have
the care and assistance of nurses. What does Katz expect of my physi
cian and of me in the way of conversations with others who care about
my well-being? Are there obligations to converse with some or all of
these people?
Katz might consider these questions somewhat unfair, or at least
not questions to ask of his book. After all, every work has a limited
scope, and the focus in his book is on the obligations of physicians to
cultivate relationships with their patients which foster their autonomy
and which respect their right to self-determination. Whatever else
physicians are obligated to do, they should not neglect the conversa
tions with patients which provide the best basis attainable for decision
making. Katz could contend that just such a focus has the salutary
effect of holding physicians strictly responsible for meeting the needs
of patients for autonomy, as well as helping to actualize their patients'
right to make choices of great import for their physical well-being and
self-respect. These are surely points well taken. I will not quarrel with
them, but neither will I accept them as adequate replies to the ques
tions I have raised and will raise below. Why is that?
To begin with, physicians do converse with families. Indeed, in
the history of medicine, there has been a fairly continuous tradition of
giving family members a true picture of the patient's condition while
continuing to hold out hope for recovery in conversing with the pa
tient, even when recovery is not expected. At times, physicians have
even withheld the truth from patients at the request of family mem
bers. These practices really require some discussion, but are absent
from Katz's book. Even so, we can reasonably infer from what Katz
says about conversations with patients that he is not likely to favor any
agreements with family members that would diminish the autonomy
and self-determination of patients. The family, which can often exert
a powerful influence upon the degree of autonomy and self-determina
tion of its members, can facilitate or hinder the attainment of goals
Katz seeks for physicians and their patients. Families, then, will be
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part of of the conversations between physicians and patients; if not
explicitly, then in hidden and unpredictable ways.
But families are to be reckoned with for still other reasons. Katz
acknowledges that the policy of accepting the decisions patients make
has to be limited in at least two instances: first, when patients may be
incompetent; and second, when patients may be making the wrong
choices (pp. 157-63).
With regard to incompetent patients, Katz never takes up directly
the paradigm instance in which families, particularly parents, are the
usual conversation partners of physicians: when the patients are chil
dren. Katz does discuss one case of a fifteen year old patient but does
not mention the family at all (pp. 161-62). As to whether fifteen year
olds are to be regarded as competent, Katz is also not explicit. From
what he does say, one can only assume that Katz is not questioning
this fifteen year old's competence, but only her refusal of a life saving
operation. Katz's counsel, which was accepted and which ended with
the patient's consent and a successful operation, never goes beyond
persuading the patient's pediatrician to continue the conversation with
her with the help of a psychiatric social worker (p. 162). Katz's ex
plicit word on incompetence is found in this brief sentence: "Short of
substantial evidence of incompetence, choices deserve to be honored"
(p. 113).
Katz thus tells us nothing about the difficulties of jUdging incom
petence in a whole range of cases, notably children, the mentally im
paired, and patients in a seriously weakened or disabled state. Since
the focus of Katz's work is on conversation, it is surely necessary to
determine with whom conversation will take place, not only to make
treatment decisions per se, but also to assess the competence of the
patient. If physicians do turn to family members, do their decisions
deserve the same respect and weight that Katz reserves for competent
patients?
But patients who are considered competent may choose wrongly.
Katz says that he
would consider disobeying a patient's choice when two conditions
have been met: one, the consequences of non-intervention pose
grave risks to a patient's immediate physical condition and, two, the
process of thinking about choices is so seriously impaired that
neither physician nor patient seem to know what one or both wish
to convey to the other (pp. 157-58).

With regard to the first condition, Katz makes it clear that he com
templates interference only when illnesses may be treated in ways that
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prevent death or predictable serious, irreversible physical injuries, and
only when death or injury would be expected to occur within a rela
tively short time. But he views this condition as necessary for inter
vention, not decisive. This interference in patients' choices must also
meet the test of an impaired process of thinking about choices (p. 158).
This impaired process is not incompetence, and Katz believes that its
occurence should be rare whenever conversations have conscientiously
and sufficiently preceded decisionmaking.
Even if interference in competent patients' choices is, or could be,
a rare event, the judgment as to when that is to happen is one that
Katz apparently is willing to lodge in the physician. What about the
judgments of husbands and wives regarding the choices of their
spouses, and the processes of thinking about these choices? What if a
husband or wife conscientiously believes that life saving treatment
should be undertaken when their spouse thinks otherwise, and the
physician judges that the criteria for interference have not been met?
Indeed, Katz does not tell us how well informed families are supposed
to be and what weight is to be given to their concern and choices with
respect to the care of another family member? What about nurses?
Should physicians consult them in jUdging when interference in pa
tients' choices is or is not the appropriate action to take?
For Katz to reply that he is concentrating on the physician-pa
tient relationship and the nature of their conversations is not enough.
After all, it is precisely the traditional belief of physicians-that people
who are not medically trained and who are ill are not competent to
make choices-which occasions Katz's book. Katz has documented
the tendency of physicians to assume that a patient's process of think
ing about choices while ill is impaired in many important respects.
One could well argue that such instances are not as rare as Katz sug
gests. Distinguishing incompetence from an impaired deliberating
process is not always easy, and what I have in mind here may be a part
of what Professor Katz regards as outright incompetence. A patient
who is very weak may still be sending out signals of acceptance or
refusal, which some may regard as "conversation" and others may
not.
The argument for conversation with patients, however, is also an
argument for conversation with others. These might include, for ex
ample, other physicians, nurses, family members, and other profes
sionals such as ministers. Because there are judgments to make about
the limits of self-determination, Katz's ideal physicians, more aware of
their own vulnerablities and limited knowledge, should perhaps be ob
ligated to converse with others besides their patients. But is it enough,
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from a moral and legal perspective, that a choice be self-determining,
that it occur in a process of thinking which is properly regarded as
unimpaired, and that life be sustained only long enough to assure that
process?
The series of questions I have been raising point to certain inade
quacies in Katz's portrayal of self-determination. Its boundaries are
left ambiguous with respect to the relationship between self-determina
tion and moral responsibility, and between self-determination and
moral deliberation. I can most quickly illustrate my contention by
referring to a recent case with which I am familar.
A young woman, no longer living with her parents, was in a hos
pital for a relatively routine operation. She showed every sign of an
uneventful recovery, but then refused to eat adequately. Given her
history of being a sparse eater, she soon showed symptoms of
malnourishment which alarmed her professional caregivers. No one
on the hospital staff was successful in getting her to eat properly. Her
father, however, who had been through previous similar episodes, was
able to persuade her to eat sufficiently. The young woman's health
returned.
Assume that the attending physician in this case had made every
effort to converse with this young woman. Assume further that the
physician had enlisted other professional help. Katz is not clear
whether he would force this woman to be fed, or whether or when he
would accept her refusal to eat as her personal right and a choice to be
honored. In short, do physicians have a strict moral obligation to
work to save a life that can be saved even when the patient opposes the
intervention necessary for that purpose? Katz does not explicitly en
dorse such an obligation, nor does he explicitly obligate patients to
seek to have life sustained in instances of this kind, where what is re
quired to sustain life is not an extremely painful, burdensome, or life
threatening intervention.
What is the role of the father who thinks his daughter is unable to
make this decision on her own? He believes his input is needed.
While it is not clear that Katz views parents as essential partners in
the necessary conversations between this patient and her physician,
there is much to suggest that Professor Katz would welcome any aid
in restoring this patient to health. Nothing in his decisionmaking
model, however, depicts a network of relations which is required to
achieve an unimpaired process of thinking about choices. The success
or failure of parental attempts at assistance is not really the issue here:
the issue is rather whether any physician should neglect to honor the
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moral responsibilities family members have for one another. Such ne
glect may be interpreted as a violation of their rights to self-determina
tion as it bears on the fate of their family members and on the process
of making choices. Suppose this young woman to be the fifteen year
old Katz discussed. Would the wish on the part of either or both par
ents that she be fed be decisive for Katz? What about a wish by either
or both that she not be fed?
As the reader surely is aware, my concern with what Katz leaves
ambiguous includes, but goes beyond, a desire for intellectual clarity.
There are moral responsibilities and deliberative processes with re
spect to them which Katz has not made a predictable, self-conscious
part of his decisionmaking model. First, all human beings who are
sufficiently "autonomous" to be "self-determining," in Katz's sense of
these terms, share a moral responsibility to make reasonable efforts to
sustain their own life and that of others: Second, there is a moral
responsibility shared by all human beings, but tied to familial and
friendship relations in a special way-a responsibility to enhance au
tonomy and self-determination and to encourage morally responsible
expressions of that autonomy.
While parents generally are perceived as moral educators of their
children, Aristotle contemplated moral improvement as an aspect of
friendship. Physicians, then, are not alone in being morally responsi
ble for strengthening the autonomy patients need to be morally re
sponsible, nor in seeking to be certain that patients' rights to make
well informed choices are honored. Moral responsibility may some
times, however, demand that physicians and family members oppose a
choice even though the process of making the choice does not seem
impaired. I offered as an example of this a case in which a young pa
tient chose starvation while feeding that patient was essentially all that
was needed to restore and maintain her health.
I have had both kinds of experiences as a family member. I felt
morally constrained to fight my father's apparent choice to be allowed
to die; thirty years later I felt morally constrained to respect my fa
ther's autonomy and allow him to die. In the first instance, my father
had a massive and painful infection following a gall bladder operation.
The physician, with undoubtedly compassionate motives, asked the
family whether treatment with antibiotics should cease. We all op
posed the cessation of treatment. My father was a strong man in
otherwise good health. So I pleaded and argued with him as he, in
. great pain, expressed a desire to die. This was not easy for me to do,
but fortunately his pain soon passed and his good health returned
quickly. Loved ones wish one another to exist; that is a very impor
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tant part of what love means. If mistakes must be made, those who
wish the life of another will err on the side of life sustenance.
But we cannot indefinitely love one another into existence and
sustain that existence. After another thirty years of good health at the
age of eighty-four, my father was stricken by cancer and spent the last
month of his life in a hospital. He underwent diagnostic testing upon
admission but refused further medical tests despite the doctor's order
for them. Because the attending physician would not disclose his diag
nosis to my father or our family, we did not have a knowledgeable
basis on which to oppose these tests. Only when I found a physician in
which we could all trust did we learn of the diagnosis already on my
father's hospital chart. Once informed of the diagnosis of terminal
cancer, we viewed as futile the surgery and further tests recommended
by the physician first in charge. It required a concerted stand by our
newly retained physician and our whole family-my brother, sister
and I-to have the tests halted and the surgery cancelled.
During this interval, the first physician was seeking consent to the
medical procedures not from my father, but from the family. As far as
we were concerned, our father was the appropriate one to decide these
matters and, despite his growing weakness, he was making it clear to
us that he wanted no more intervention. He gradually declined over
the next two weeks. He took food by mouth until three days before he
died, but then refused. Agreeing that death was imminent, our new
physician and the family declined to forcefully administer nourish
ment in those last three days. Our father died peacefully and, as far as
we could tell, not painfully.
I wish to emphasize that I do not regard failing to provide nour
ishment as morally responsible if it will be the proximate cause of
death or a source of discomfort. In my view, withholding or with
drawing nourishment can be justified only when death is imminent
and no discomfort to the patient will result. To justify painful inter
ventions requires reasonable certainty of a compensating benefit, as in
the case of life saving surgery that is not in itself unduly risky, or ad
ministering antibiotics to someone in pain in the reasonable hope that
thereby health will be restored and the cause of pain eradicated.
Being morally responsible, then, is not necessarily achieved by be
ing self-determining. Some expressions of self-determination are im
moral. Thus, Katz expects self-determining physicians and patients to
engage in honest communication, striving conscientiously to deceive
neither themselves nor one another. Deception robs the person being
deceived of some degree of autonomy and hence of the very capacity
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to be self-determining. For example, patients who are successfully
convinced that their illness is not fatal, when in fact it is, do not have
the necessary basis for making the most reasonable choices with re
spect to their treatment and how they will spend their remaining time.
Truth-telling and sustaining life are indeed basic moral values.
They are requisite for all of the cooperative activities that characterize
human communities and make them possible, and for self-determina
tion as well. That communities and individuals need truth-telling and
protection of life is recognized and evidenced by laws against certain
breaches in faithful communication2 as well as life threatening and
homicidal acts. 3 At the same time, legislatures and courts protect a
wide range of freedoms and increasingly, in medical decisions, what
has come to be identified as a right of privacy.4 It is precisely at this
point that serious conflicts arise between satisfying the community's
obligation to life on the one hand, and to self-determination on the
other. Three differing views of this conflict are presented in the deci
sion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy,5 decided Janu
ary 17, 1985.
The Conroy case concerns an incompetent, bedridden, eighty
four year old nursing home patient with irreversible physical and
mental impairments and a limited li(e expectancy.6 The issue for deci
sion was a request by her guardian nephew to remove from this patient
the nasogastric feeding tube which served as her primary conduit for
nutrients and was necessary to prevent her death from malnutrition. 7
The trial court which first heard the case decided that the re
moval of the feeding tube should be permitted. 8 Finding that Ms.
2. See. e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (excluding privileged information from the dis
covery process); FED. R. EVID. 501 (shielding statements made within protected relation
ships against compulsory disclosure on witness stand); READINGS IN LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY 161-65 (R. Allen, E. Ferster & J. Rubin eds. 1968) (listing of various state
statutes protecting confidential communications made within the doctor-patient relation
ship); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957)
(articulating physician's duty to maintain confidentiality unless disclosure becomes "neces
sary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community").
3. See. e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1, 210.5, 211.1, 211.2 (Official Draft 1962)
(Criminal Homicide, Causing or Aiding Suicide, Assault and Recklessly Endangering An
other Person, respectively).
4. See. e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2501 (1984); FLA. STAT. § 4 (1984); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 449 (Michie 1977) (natural death acts); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647 (1976).
5. 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209.
6. Id. at 335, 340,486 A.2d at 1216, 1219-20.
7. Id. at 355, 486 A.2d at 1216.
8. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (1983).
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Conroy's life had become impossibly and permanently burdensome,
the court reasoned that prolonging her life would be pointless and per
haps cruel.9 At the same time, the court determined that removing the
tube would lead to death by starvation and dehydration within a few
days and this death could be a painful one. \0
In my view, this court did not show sufficient regard for either the
value of self-determination or of life. Whether a person's life is to be
regarded as "burdensome" relative to an illness, impairment, or medi
cal treatment is precisely a judgment that depends on that person's
own perception. People have different reactions to pain, for example,
and something one person finds very painful may not be reported to be
so by someone else. Indeed, we remain uncertain whether one person
may actually be experiencing a lesser degree of pain or assessing that
pain based on a higher degree of tolerance for painful stimuli. Neither
courts nor physicians nor even family members are in a position to
decide when someone else's life has become too much to bear.
The trial court in Conroy did something even more astounding,
however, when it chose to permit an act which it had determined
would result in death for the patient. What has happened to the pro
tection of the patient's right to life? I am inclined to think that, if a
court can sanction an act that is the proximate cause of the death of a
person innocent of any crime and posing no threat to anyone's life,
those on the court responsible for that decision should be liable to a
charge of unlawful homicide or subject to a suit for damages brought
by the patient's loved ones.
The New Jersey Appellate Court argued, as I have, that with
drawing Ms. Conroy's nasogastric tube would be tantamount to killing
her. I I It would not be a case of letting her die, but would instead be
active euthanasia. The appellate court regarded such a course as
"ethically impermissible."12 Since Ms. Conroy was not facing immi
nent death, depriving her of food would, under these circumstances,
constitute hastening death rather than simply allowing her illness to
take its natural course.
When the New Jersey Supreme Court took up the case, it relaxed
the strict protection of life announced by the appellate court. I J The
supreme court asserted a right of privacy that included the right to
9.
10.
11.
(1983).
12.

13.

Id. at 528, 457 A.2d at 1235.
Id. at 530, 457 A.2d at 1236.
In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 453, 472-73, 464 A.2d 303, 313-14
Id. at 473-74, 464 A.2d at 314.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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refuse nourishment, even if death was not imminent. 14 The supreme
court did expressly limit such a right of refusal to those who were
deemed to be terminally ill and expected to die within a year or less. IS
The supreme court did not, like the appellate court, regard this as
killing such patients, despite the fact that death without proper nour
ishment would, for many, occur before they died of their illness. 16
Furthermore, the supreme court did not limit the withholding or with
drawing of nourishment to instances where patients requested it, but
extended such permission to instances in which patients were in un
avoidably severe pain, in circumstances otherwise comparable to those
of Ms. Conroy.17 The court thereby made a judgment for someone
else regarding what kind of life is too burdensome. What constitutes a
burdensome life, however, is emphatically a matter best left to self
determination.
Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court dissented in
part. 18 Pain, he argued, can usually be controlled. 19 There is often
disagreement among health care providers about the severity of a pa
tient's pain, as there was in Ms. Conroy's case. 20 Justice Handler took
the position that judicial permission to withhold a life sustaining treat
ment from someone incompetent to make such a choice should be lim
ited to persons terminally ill and imminently dying. 21 Justice Handler,
then, appropriately in my view, did not wish to involve a court of law
in permitting an action or inaction which could be the proximate cause
of an innocent person's death.
In re Conroy provides an example of how the same case may elicit
significantly different responses from the three courts just examined.
The appellate court was the only one of the three to insist that the
court not permit an act that it perceived as one that would lead to the
death of the patient.2 2 The courts, then, do not always err on the side
of life, as I would urge them to. Although the New Jersey Supreme
Court claimed that it was protecting life by limiting the withdrawal or
withholding of nourishment only to terminally ill patients, this claim
is undercut by their allowance of the withdrawal as much as a year
14. Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1222-23 (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 70, 355 A.2d
647, 663 (1970».
IS. Id. at 363-64, 486 A.2d at 1230-31.
16. Id. at 350-57,486 A.2d at 1224.
17. Id. at 364-66, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
18. Id. at 388, 486 A.2d 1244.
19. Id. at 394, 486 A.2d at 1247.
20. Id. at 394-95, 486 A.2d at 1247.
21. Id. at 397-98, 486 A.2d at 1249.
22. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 453, 469, 464 A.2d 303, 312 (1983).
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before the patient's death is expected. This position thus involves the
court in an act that would be the proximate cause of the patient's
death. I do not see how such a decision can be left to the courts. To
counter this improper judicial interference it appears that legislation is
needed to specify that prior to a patient's imminent death, food and
water are to be treated like the air we breathe and not only as medical
treatments. After all, subsequent to removing someone from a respira
tor, we do not also remove all air from their room to make sure the
patient will not breathe again. Removing a feeding tube when it is
needed to sustain life and when death is not imminent is the moral
equivalent of taking someone off a respirator and then also removing
any air supply from him or her. The needed legislation, applied to the
concept of a living will, would limit the content of such a will with
respect to these decisions about food and water.
The roles I am suggesting for courts and legislatures with regard
to medical decisions are minimal, though important. One role is to try
to assure that life is adequately protected; the other is to try to assure
that persons who, for whatever reason, are regarded as incompetent
enjoy the same protection as competent persons.
Who, then, is generally responsible for medical decisionmaking?
Katz is right to emphasize the obligation to do what can be done to
bolster the autonomy of patients and to respect their right to make
choices. But as I have contended, physicians are not the only ones
with the responsibility and desire to do this. Friends, family members,
the clergy, and nurses also can contribute mightily to the freedom of
patients and can point that freedom in the direction of what is best in
the moral sense.
Ethicists have identified certain parameters of decision making
which tend to function implicitly as criteria of decisionmaking and
which may be helpfully rendered explicit. These are first, factual
knowledge; second, vividly imagining how everyone is affected by an
action or policy; and third, impartiality.23
The special education and experience of physicians and other
health professionals impose special responsibilities on them. This in
cludes the duty of faithful communication and conscientious efforts to
avoid self-deception. But friends and family members often know a
great deal about a patient and this knowledge deserves attention and
evaluation by both health professionals and their patients.
When physicians or patients or both imagine the effect of a medi
23. See. e.g., A.
ch. VI (1973).

DYCK, ON HUMAN CARE

ch. VII (1977); W.

FRANKENA, ETHICS,
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cal choice, it is vital for them to be in touch with the patient's loved
ones. While health professionals may sometimes find families or
friends of patients too zealously opposing or urging treatment, it is
important that they deal with these positions because patients may
otherwise adopt extremes of action or inaction. And while health pro
fessionals need to be advocates of sustaining life and ameliorating ill
nesses when they can, under some circumstances, especially in the last
days of a patient's life, comfort may become their central concern and
may be the most responsible use of their talents.
Impartiality, in the context of medical care, means at the very
least equal consideration of the rights to life and self-determination of
all human beings. It also means that quality of care is maintained and
applied equally to everyone as is medically indicated and responsibly
chosen. No one, patient or health professional, is immune from being
influenced by their likes and dislikes and their own preferences for
particular modes of care. For these reasons, physicians should wel
come the opportunity to explore how patients perceive their conditions
and the care being recommended; they should likewise welcome the
possible correction of perspective that nurses, the clergy, or next of kin
may contribute. In this essay I have discussed some examples of a
parent in one case,24 a whole family in another,25 whose determined
efforts to keep awake their loved ones' will to live was necessary to
obtain a recovery from illness. Indeed, I suggest that in those difficult
decisions which, if followed, could mean death for the patient, a single
voice insisting on the course of action most likely to sustain life should
prevail. That voice may be that of physician, nurse, patient, or loved
one. At the same time, to refuse life sustaining treatment should re
quire a consensus of these same moral agents. I take for granted that
someone who feels deeply that the decision being made is morally
wrong and a violation of the patient's rights has recourse to the courts.
Jay Katz has done us all a favor by making a case for strengthen
ing patient autonomy and respect for the freedom to be self-determin
ing. I have built on these important concepts, but I have tried to
indicate that achieving this is the responsibility of all health profes
sionals and loved ones involved with a given patient. In the end, the
right to self-determination is a right to be morally responsible as well
as a right to be treated in a morally responsible way.

24. See supra p. 58.
25. See supra pp. 59-60.

